

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

United States of America,

Plaintiff,

v.

LUIS Gonzalo CAUICH CARBAJAL

Defendant.

Case No. CR 14-0651-TEH

STIPULATED ORDER EXCLUDING TIME
UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT


For the reasons stated by the parties on the record on JANUARY 9, 2015, the Court excludes time under the Speedy Trial Act from JANUARY 9, 2015 to FEBRUARY 23, 2015 and finds that the ends of justice served by the continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). The Court makes this finding and bases this continuance on the following factor(s):

- _____ Failure to grant a continuance would be likely to result in a miscarriage of justice. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(i).
- _____ The case is so unusual or so complex, due to [*check applicable reasons*] _____ the number of defendants, _____ the nature of the prosecution, or _____ the existence of novel questions of fact or law, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or the trial itself within the time limits established by this section. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(ii).
- _____ Failure to grant a continuance would deny the defendant reasonable time to obtain counsel, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv).
- _____ Failure to grant a continuance would unreasonably deny the defendant continuity of counsel, given counsel's other scheduled case commitments, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv).
- ☒ Failure to grant a continuance would unreasonably deny the defendant the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 1-9-15


JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY
United States Magistrate Judge

STIPULATED: 
Attorney for Defendant


Assistant United States Attorney